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INTERNATIONAL PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
COST CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM IN TilE 
UNITED STATES 
MARTHA ANN HoLT* 
Abstract: Rising prescription drug prices have been a point of 
contention in the United States for decades. Questions such as who 
should shoulder the cost and what role the government should play in 
setting drug prices are central to the debate. Other nations face similar 
concerns and have developed prescription drug plans that incorporate 
various cost containment strategies. An analysis of prescription drug 
coverage in other nations may help educate domestic lawmakers on the 
complexities of these cost containment strategies. The United States 
could benefit from the lessons learned abroad. 
INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical trade is a profitable industry} Over the last 
three decades, pharmaceutical companies in the United States expe-
rienced a return on equity more than 7% higher than that of all other 
industries.2 With the United States experiencing a 16-20% increase in 
drug spending per year, the success of pharmaceutical companies may 
be expected to continue.3 Many Americans, however, turn a critical 
eye to pharmaceutical companies, perceiving that pharmaceutical 
companies have been "price-gouging and profiteering from the 
American public for years. "4 It is not uncommon for Americans to pay 
over twice as much as their European counterparts for the same drug 
* Martha Ann Holt is the Senior Production Editor of the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 Sec Robert H. Ballance, Market and Industrial Structure, in CoNTESTED GRoUND: PuB-
uc PURPOSE AND PRIVATE INTEREST IN THE REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 95, 103-
04 (Peter DaYis ed., 1996). 
2 /d. 
3 Sec Scott Hensley & Joni James, How Pfizer Gained an Edge in Battle over Drug Prices, 
WALL ST.j. EuR,July 9, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL-WSJE 21832589. 
4 Christiane Sauter, Drug Companies Out for Themselves, ThE PosT-STANDARD (London), 
Jan. 18, 2002, at All, available at 2002 WL 5979242 (letter to the editor). 
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and dosage.5 This fact has led many to complain that the United 
States is in fact subsidizing European health care.6 
One proposed solution to the apparent unfair allocation of drug 
development costs is for the United States to impose its own drug cost 
regulations.7 Pharmaceutical companies and other skeptics, however, 
argue that increased price controls and other governmental regula-
tions affecting the sale of prescription drugs will lead to decreased 
innovation with regard to new prescription drugs.8 Congress finds it-
self in the middle of the debate. It must balance the demands of a 
public that expects constant advances in medical technology against 
the financial needs of the pharmaceutical companies that conduct the 
research and produce the life-saving drugs.9 
Part I of this note exposes the dilemma of price controls, as well 
as the economics of research a:nd development (R&D) and cost re-
couping by pharmaceutical companies. Part II reviews the different 
options available to Congress for a U.S. prescription drug plan by sur-
veying the different types of regulations employed by other govern-
ments. Part III explores some of the alternative solutions to govern-
ment price controls, including the programs several U.S. states are in 
the process of implementing. Part IV discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various prescription drug plans discussed in Parts I 
through III. Finally, Part V of this note argues for Congressional adop-
tion of a Medicare prescription drug coverage plan and describes the 
characteristics of such a plan. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE EcoNOMics oF PRESCRIPTION DRuG PRICING 
A. Overview of the Principles Behind Prescription Drug Differentials and 
Governmental Regulations 
Government regulation of prescription drugs entails, among 
other things, price regulations and patent protection.10 Government 
5 See David]. Gross, et al., Prices for Prescription Drugs: The Ro!Rs of Market Forces and Gov-
ernment Regulation, in CoNTESTED GRoUND, supra note I, at 124, I34. 
6 Tom Buerkle, EU Weighs Lifting of Price Contmls-Bid to End Market Distortions, INT'L 
HERALD ThiB., Nov. I8, I998, at A20, availabiR at I998 WL 4795412. 
7 See Review & Outlook: Europe's Addiction, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at AI8, availabiR at 
2002 WL-WSJ 338I809 [hereinafter Europe's Addiction]. 
8 See PATRICIA M. DANZON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULA'llON: NKflONAL Poucn:s 
VERSUS GLOBAL INTERESTS 3-4 (I997). 
9 See Ballance, supra note I, at 95. 
JO Gross, supra note 5, at I24. 
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regulation is one of the two most influential factors affecting prescrip-
tion drug price differentials between countries. 11 The second deter-
minant is market forces. 12 The primary market force behind the re-
couping of R&D of prescription drugs is the elasticity of the consumer 
demand for the drugs.13 
Elasticity of demand reflects the consumer price responsiveness.l4 
Economist Frank Ramsey argues that the most efficient way for a 
company to recoup costs does not entail charging all consumers the 
same price.15 Instead, the company should charge those consumers 
whose valuation of the product is high a larger fee than those con-
sumers whose valuation is low. 16 The logic behind this pricing scheme 
is that a consumer who values a product highly will pay more for that 
product than the consumer who remains indifferent to the product.~' 
By charging the high-valuing consumer more for the service, the 
company can then charge the low valuing consumer less, thereby re-
taining the patronage of the latter.18 The high-valuation consumer's 
demand is inelastic in relation to the price of the product. 19 Where 
consumer demand is relatively inelastic to price, pharmaceutical 
companies can charge more for a product than they could in a mar-
ket where consumer demand is elastic, or fluctuating in response to 
drug price.20 
An example of the impact of elastic consumer demand on the 
price of prescription drugs is the practice of pharmaceutical company 
discounts offered to hospitals. 21 Most hospitals operate their own in-
house pharmacies.22 As a result, a hospital can decide which drugs its 
physicians prescribe-limiting prescriptions to those drugs that the 
hospital pharmacy chooses to stock.23 Hospitals thus have significant 
bargaining power in transactions with pharmaceutical companies.24 In 
order to assure that the hospital will buy and use its drug, a pharma-
llfd. 
12 !d. at 124-25. 
13 !d.; DANZON, supra note 8, at 11. 
14 Sec Gross, supra note 5, at 126. 
15 DANZON, supra note 8, at 11-12. 
16 !d. at 12. 
17 Sec id. 
18 !d. 
19 Sec id. at 11. 
2o Sec DANZON, supra note 8, at 11. 
21 SnJARTO. ScHWEITZER, PHARMACJ:uncAL EcoNOMics AND Poucv 104 (1997). 
22 Sec id. 
23 Sec id. 
24 Sec id. 
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ceutical company will regularly offer a substantial discount on bulk 
purchases of its product. 25 
Individual commercial pharmacies service a broad range of pri-
vate customer needs.26 As a result, such pharmacies must stock a di-
verse and large quantity of pharmaceutical drugs.27 A private phar-
macy's selection of drugs is more passive than that of a hospital 
pharmacy.2s A private pharmacy's demands for drugs are thus rela-
tively price inelastic, since its goal is to maintain a stock of all major 
drugs on the market in order to meet the demands of its customers.29 
Drug prices also reflect various government regulations of pre-
scription drugs, some of which are discussed infra.30 Governments 
primarily implement drug price regulations to help control, and re-
duce, public spending on prescription drugs. 31 While government 
regulation certainly can be an effective means to reduce the individ-
ual cost of drug therapy, it may not be the most efficient.32 No existing 
governmental regulation has succeeded in curbing the steady increase 
in overall drug spending.33 For example, in France, price control 
regulation allows for some of the lowest prescription drug prices in 
Europe.34 Overall, drug spending in France is still 16% of total health 
care costs-about double its counterpart proportion in the United 
States.35 
At the core of the drug price controversy remains the fact that 
pharmaceutical companies ultimately set the price of prescription 
drugs in the United States.36 Pharmaceutical companies fix drug 
prices based almost exclusively on their R&D costs and profit goals. 37 
25 See id. 
26 See ScHWEITZER, supra note 21, at 104. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. 
30 Gross, supra note 5, at 124. 
3! DANZON, supra note 8, at 15-16. A secondary goal of price regulation is to promote 
the domestic development and production of drugs. !d. 
32 See id. at 30. 
33 See id. at 15, 30. 
34 ScHWEITZER, supra note 21, at 149. 
35 Id. 
38 See Trudy Lieberman, Health Matters: Why Health Costs Sting Again, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
21, 2002, at S1, available at 2002 WL 2447989. At least one state is pursuing criminal 
charges against major pharmaceutical companies, alleging that the companies used bogus 
pricing schemes to defraud both the state and consumers of tens of millions of dollars. 
Brendan Riley, Nevada Sues Major Drug Firms, AP ONLINE, Jan. 18, 2002, available at 2002 
WL 10032815. 
37 Lieberman, supra note 36. 
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Compounding this element is the fact that some consumers regularly 
pay for prescription drugs out-of-pocket, as opposed to receiving 
third-party coverage.38 
B. Impact of Plice Regulations on the Innovation of Drugs 
Critics of government regulation of drug prices argue that gov-
ernment-regulated limitations on a pharmaceutical company's ability 
to turn a profit will remove the company's incentive to invest in 
R&D.39 This concern is not unfounded.4° Canada experienced a drop 
of more than 50% in domestic drug research after it implemented 
price controls in the 1960s.41 A similar trend occurred in other coun-
tries following their introduction of price controls.42 In fact, in recent 
years, many companies have moved their R&D dollars to the United 
States-a forum unbridled by price controls. 43 
II. GovERNMENTAL REGULATION ScHEMES AIMED AT REDUCING THE 
CosT OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS TO THE CONSUMER 
Foreign price regulations have a "spill-over effect" on the Ameri-
can drug market.44 Price regulations abroad have a vast impact on the 
way pharmaceutical companies operate in the United States.45 Con-
versely, any attempts by the United States to regulate the pharmaceu-
tical industry will impact the pharmaceutical market of other coun-
tries.46 As such, politicians must evaluate all of the alternatives with an 
eye toward the long- and short-term benefits that such a regulatory 
scheme might have for consumers, against the long-term effect on 
societyY 
38 ScHWEITZER, supra note 21, at 97. 
39 See generalzy DANZON, supra note 8. 
40 See John Stossel, The Price of Medicine: Quit Blaming the Drug Companies, ACNEws.coM, 
Jan. 18, 2002, available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/daily-news/gmab_ 
drugco_020118.html [hereinafter Price of Medicine]. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. 
43 See Europe's A.ddiction, supra note 7. 
44 Sec DANZON, supra note 8, at 2. 
45 See id. 
46 Sec id. 
47 Ballance, supra note I, at 95. 
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A. United States' Health Care System 
The United States is one of a few nations whose health care sys-
tem does not fit one of the common national health care formats. 48 
The United States has no cohesive health care system, but rather a 
mix of private and public health care plans.49 
1. Private Health Care Systems and Cost Containment Strategies for 
Prescription Drugs Currently Employed 
The private health care industry is a conglomerate of indemnity 
programs, through which an insurance company reimburses the cli-
ent for medical care rendered, and managed care programs, whereby 
the insurance company closely manages the administration by provid-
ers of medical care to patients.50 Prescription drug coverage varies 
from program to program.51 Recently, the United States has experi-
enced a shift towards greater use of managed care. 52 
Almost every prescription coverage plan in the United States 
employs similar cost containment strategies.53 The most significant of 
these include manufacturer discounts, drug formularies, and forced 
generic substitution.54 As discussed supra, major purchasers, such as 
hospitals and health plans, can negotiate with pharmaceutical com-
panies for lower drug prices.55 Major purchasers may choose to pur-
chase the lowest priced drug in a drug class.56 This is particularly true 
where there is little difference between the different drugs in a 
specific drug class.57 Where prescription drug comparisons are not 
available, major purchasing groups may utilize cost-effectiveness 
strategies, such as choosing to buy a more costly drug that tends to 
keep patients out of the hospital longer than do cheaper drugs. 58 Ma-
jor purchasers may also receive cost savings by dealing with drug 
48 Albert Wertheimer, et al., Pharmacy in the Western World Health Care Systems, in CoN-
TESTED GROUND, supra note 1, at 159, 169. 
49 See id. at 169-70. 
50 ld. 
51 Id. at 170. 
52 ScHWEITZER, supra note 21, at 171. 
53 ld. at 174. 
54 Id. at 174-77. 
55 ld. at 175. 
56 ld. 
57 ScHWEITZER, supra note 21, at 175. 
58 !d. 
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wholesalers, who in turn negotiate drug discounts with drug manufac-
turers. 59 
Many health care plans attempt to reduce the cost of prescription 
drugs through the use of formularies. 60 A formulary is a means by 
which the plan lists drugs by their efficiency and cost.61 Plans typically 
create a committee made up of physicians and pharmacists to evalu-
ate the dose requirements, side effects, and efficiency of a drug, as 
well as its cost.62 The committee then ranks the drugs accordingly.63 
Doctors are limited to prescribing only those drugs listed on the for-
mulary.64 
Health care plans face efficiency problems when implementing 
drug formularies. 65 Because drugs affect patients in different ways, 
formularies must include mechanisms to take special situations into 
account.66 With too much flexibility, the formulary cannot effectively 
contain costs, since the point of a formulary is to restrict the type of 
drug a physician can prescribe.67 However, if the formulary is too 
strict, the patient faces the possibility of taking a drug that is not well 
suited for her.68 Health care plans must take both costs into consid-
eration when creating their fornmlaries.69 
Many managed care systems require their patients to consume 
ge~1eric versions of drugs when available. 70 Generic drugs cost less 
than their brand-name counterparts, and are a useful substitute for 
therapeutically similar prescription drugs. 71 Likewise, such plans 
sometimes encourage the use of over-the-counter medicines that also 
tend to be less expensive and that do not need physician-directed pre-
scription refills. 72 
59 !d. 
60 !d. 
61 !d. 
62 ScnWEITZER, supra note 21, at 175. 
63 !d. 
64 /d. 
65 !d. at I 76. 
66 !d. 
67 ScHWEITZER, supra note 21, at 176. 
68 /d. 
69 !d. 
70 !d. at 177. 
71 See id. 
72 ScHWEITZER, supra note 21, at 177. 
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2. Public Health Care Systems and Cost Containment Strategies for 
Prescription Drugs Currently Employed in the United States 
The public health care system in the United States includes 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. 73 Medicare provides health care to 
elderly or disabled persons.74 Employers and employees provide fund-
ing for Medicare via contributions made throughout the individual's 
career, augmented by small premiums during the period that the in-
dividual receives coverage. 71> Medicare does not yet provide coverage 
for outpatient prescription drug costs, although Congress is currently 
debating the possibility of introducing Medicare prescription drug 
coverage.76 Medicaid is a state and federally funded program that cov-
ers the poor and unemployed. 77 Medicaid offers prescription drug 
coverage, which includes guidelines that set the amount of reim-
bursement to the pharmacies and manufacturers.78 
Since Medicaid prescription drug coverage is state nm, drug 
plans differ from state to state.79 Patients covered by Medicaid gener-
ally receive their medications from private independent pharmacies.80 
Medicaid covered consumers may be required to make a nominal co-
payment at the time of purchase.81 The Medicaid program then reim-
burses the pharmacy a set amount for the prescription drug.82 This 
amount is usually a fixed percentage less than the estimated acquisi-
tion cost.83 In this manner, the state pays the actual acquisition cost, 
plus a slight retail mark-up.84 Medicaid programs also employ formu-
laries, restricting the drugs for which they will reimburse.85 
73 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 170. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.; see generally Laying the Groundwork for a Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, Before the 
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong.(2001) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Direc-
tor, Cong. Budget Office), available at http:/ /www.cbo.gov/testimony.cfm [hereinafter 
CBO Medicare Testimony]. 
77 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 170. 
78 Id. at 171. 
79 SCHWEITZER, supra note 21, at 183. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 !d. 
83 !d. 
84 ScHWEITZER, supra note 21, at 183-84. 
85 Id. at 184. 
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B. National Health Insurance System 
France and Germany both operate a form of a National Health 
Insurance (NHI) system.86 The governments raise funds used to pay 
for health care provided by the private doctors, government-run clin-
ics, community hospitals, and the like.87 The governments thus be-
come monopsonists--the opposite of monopolists-thereby becoming 
lone buyers instead of single suppliers.88 The governments use the 
power afforded them as the single prescription drug buyers to im-
plement their own agendas and policy initiatives, including the impo-
sition of price controls for prescription drugs.89 The French and 
German National Health Insurance Systems regulate drug prices in 
different ways.90 
1. Prescription Drug Coverage in France 
France maintains a list of products approved for reimburse-
ment.9I Almost all prescription drugs make it to the reimbursement 
list; however, there are different lists for outpatient and hospital use.92 
France established a transparency commission to both regulate the 
price of prescription drugs and determine the amount the govern-
ment shall reimburse patients.93 Because of strict guidelines regarding 
the commission's pricing of prescription drugs, pharmaceutical prices 
in France are among the lowest in the world.94 Consumers in France 
first pay for drugs themselves at the point of purchase, and then apply 
for a reimbursement from the social security agency.95 After reim-
bursement, the patient generally pays very little out of pocket for the 
drug.96 
86 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 162. 
87 /d. at 161. 
88 /d.; Eumpe's Addiction, supra note 7, at A18. 
89 See id. 
90 /d. at 162. 
91 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 162. 
9~ !d. 
93 /d. at 162-63. 
94Jd. 
95 !d. at 163. 
96 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 163. 
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2. Prescription Drug Coverage in Germany 
Germany enjoys a health care system that covers 100% of its 
population.97 This is achieved through a combination of regional 
health insurance agencies known as "sickness funds," government 
employee health care coverage, and private health care plans.98 
Ninety-two percent of Germans are covered under the sickness funds, 
which receive financing via public payroll taxation.99 These sickness 
funds use a negative prescription drug list that lists drugs for which 
the government will not reimburse.100 Most of the drugs listed on the 
negative drug registry treat minor ailments, such as colds, or life style 
drugs, including oral contraceptives.101 A national association that 
represents doctors and the sickness funds determines the negative 
list.l02 
Germany does not set the price of prescription drugs. 103 How-
ever, it does establish a reference price for prescription drugs, thereby 
setting the maximum amount the sickness fund will pay for a selected 
group of drugs.l04 Reference prices are set for certain generic catego-
ries, products that are pharmacologically similar-but not generically 
equivalent-and products that have a similar therapeutic action. 105 
The reference price is set slightly higher than the lowest priced drug 
in the group so as to insure innovation, to insure sufficient supply of 
drugs, and to induce effective price competition.106 
The reference price for a product may be divided into subgroups 
to reflect different dosages of a product as well as a diverse means of 
delivering the product (e.g., by way of a topical patch as opposed to 
sublingual).107 German patients are required to pay a certain amount 
for each subgroup, and must pay the difference if their prescribed 
drug is more expensive than the reference price.' 08 The government 
regularly audits a prescriber's performance to evaluate his or her 
97 /d. at 164-65. 
98 /d. at 164. 
99 /d. 
100 /d. at 165. 
101 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 165. 
102 /d. 
103 /d. 
104 /d. 
105 /d. 
1°6 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 165. 
107 /d. 
108 /d. at 166. 
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efficiency.109 Also, if a doctor is found to have exceeded his or her 
fixed pharmaceutical budget by 15%, he or she must provide an ex-
planation.II0 If the budget is 25% more than her fixed amount, the 
doctor may face repayment.1II 
C. National Health Service System 
In a National Health Service (NHS) system, the government 
owns the health care facilities and employs the health care workers. 112 
Since the government administers the whole of the health care indus-
try, it can directly regulate drug prices.113 Britain operates a NHS that 
is funded largely by an income tax payable to a national insurance 
fund and augmented by a co-payment by the patient for some serv-
ices.II4 
Britain influences prescription drug prices by implementing 
three policy tools: (a) the Prescription Price Regulation Scheme 
(PPRS), (b) the drug list, and (c) the drug tariff. 115 The PPRS is based 
on a voluntary collective agreement between the British government's 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) and the Associa-
tion of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), which represents 
large pharmaceutical companies operating in Britain.116 Under the 
PPRS, the DHSS negotiates with individual pharmaceutical corpora-
tions in order to set maximum profit margin percentages, advertising 
cost limitations, and R&D budgets.II7 Under the PPRS, pharmaceuti-
cal firms are free to set their own prices for the first five years a drug is 
on the market, subject only to the profit margin lirnitation.118 Mter 
the five-year period, any price increases must be approved by the 
109 /d. 
110 /d. 
111 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 166. 
112 /d. at 166-67. 
113 /d. at 167. 
114 /d. 
115 See id.; Christine Huttin, Price Control Policies in the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Selection 
of Case Studies, in STUDIES IN PHARMACEUTICAL EcoNOMICS 275, 276 (Mickey C. Smith, ed., 
1996). 
116 Huttin, supra note 115, at 276. Britain's National Health Service only monitors 
pharmaceutical firms that ha\'e over $500,000 in sales a year. Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 
167. 
117 Huttin, supra note 115, at 276. 
118 \'\Tertheimer, supra note 48, at 167-68. 
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DHSS.ll9 Note that Britain does not directly regulate the prescription 
drug prices.12o 
In addition to the PPRS, Britain maintains a Selected List-a reg-
ister of drugs for which the NHS will not reimburse. 121 The list con-
tains 16 categories of drugs that include analgesics, cold medicines, 
and vitamins that are typically used to treat minor conditions, and 
most of which are available over-the-counter.122 
Lastly, the NHS encourages the use of generic drugs by imple-
mentation of a drug tariff.l23 Drug tariff prices are determined by ma-
jor generic drug manufacturers and published and distributed to phy-
sicians on a monthly basis.124 Since most generic drug manufacturers 
are too small to be covered under the PPRS, the drug tariff establishes 
the reimbursement amount for generic drugs. 125 Britain also encour-
ages the use of generic drugs via a budget mechanism.126 The NHS 
proscribes a budget for services each group of physicians provides per 
capita-per patient enrolled with the physician's group.127 The NHS 
also allows for reallocation of prescription funds when the physician 
saves money by prescribing generic drugs. 128 Because of the NHS 
treatment of generic drugs, 43% of all prescriptions filled in Britain 
are for generic drugs.t29 
III. ALTERNATIVEs To GovERNMENT REGULATION OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRuG CosT 
Currently, there are numerous prescription drug plans that are 
offered by entities other than the federal government.130 Recognizing 
the increased attention being given to the rising costs of prescription 
drugs, several private industries have created industry-friendly pro-
119 !d. 
120 !d. at 167. 
121 !d. 
122 !d. 
123 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 168; Huttin, supra note 115, at 277. 
124 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 168; Huttin, supra note 115, at 277. 
125 See Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 168; Huttin, supra note 115, at 277. 
126 See Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 168. 
127 !d. at 168-69. 
128 !d. 
129 !d. at 168. 
130 See e.g., PhRMA, Pharmaceutical Company Patient i\ssistance Programs, at http://www. 
phrma.org/pap/more.cfm (last visited Jan. 1, 2003) [hereinafter PhRMA A.ssistance Pro-
grams]; RxHope.com, About RxHope.com, at http:/ /www.rxhope.com/about/main.asp (last 
visited Jan. 1. 2003) [hereinafter RxHope]; RxAssist, ll.ccessing Pharmaceutical Patient Assis-
tance Programs, at http:/ /www.rxassist.org/ default.cfm (last visited Jan. 1, 2003). 
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grams that attempt to reduce the strain of prescription drug costs on 
certain classes of consumers. 131 In addition to private programs, a 
handful of states have recently enacted programs aimed at reducing 
state spending on prescription drugs covered under the state Medi-
caid plan. 132 
In fact, the federal government recently elicited cooperation 
from private discount card companies to create a Medicare-endorsed 
prescription drug discount card.I 33 This card is meant to provide im-
mediate, albeit limited, relief to Medicare recipients who do not have 
prescription drug coverage.134 The federal government has also dis-
cussed adopting a Medicare prescription drug plan.I35 
A. Pharmaceutical Industry Created Agreements 
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA) is the lobbying front of drug manufacturers in the United 
States.136 It stresses that drug manufacturers are committed to provid-
ing programs that enable receipt of prescription drugs by patients 
who might not otherwise be able to afford them. 137 Most manufactur-
ers offer some sort of program that provides free medicine to the 
most needy patients. 138 Other manufacturers set a flat fee for their 
drugs when sold to eligible seniors. 139 Each program provides some 
131 Sec PhRMA A.ssistancc Programs. supra note 130; RxHope, supra note 130. 
132 Sec, e.g., Act to Establish Fairer Pricing for Prescription Drugs, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, § 2681 (2002) [hereinafter Maine Bill]; Ph arm. Researcher & Mfrs. of Am. v. Dep't 
of Cmty. Health, 2002 WL 31810210 (describing the Michigan supplemental and basic 
rebate programs for prescription drugs) [hereinafter Michigan Program]; S.R. 55 (Wis. 
2001), H.R. 144 (Wis. 2001) [hereinafter Proposed Wisconsin Bill]. 
133 Sec, e.g., Medicare Program: Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance 
Initiative, 42 C.F.R. § 403 (US Dep't of Health and Human Svcs., proposed Nov. 5, 2002), 
available at http:/ /"Aww.nacds.org/user-assets/PDF _files/feb02_pdc_initiative.pdf [herein-
after HHS Medicare Initiative]. 
134 !d. 
135 See generally, CBO Medicare Testimony, supra note 76; see also Medicare Reform: 
Providing Prescription Drug Coverage for Seniors, Before the House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 1 07th Con g. (2001) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Director, Con g. Budget Of-
fice), available at http:/ /www.cbo.gov/testirnony.cfm. 
136 Sec PhRJ\H il.ssistancc Programs, supra note 130. 
137 !d. 
138 PhRJ\fA, Dircctm~v of Prescription Drug Patient A.ssistancc Programs, at http://www. 
phrma.org (lasnisitedjan. 1, 2003) [hereinafter PhRAfil. Directory]. 
139 Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer to Provide Health Benefits, Including $15 Flat Fee for 
Pfizer Prescriptions, to Low-Income Seniors Across America (jan. 15, 2002), at http:/ I 
www. pfizer.com/ are I news_releases/ mn_2002_ 0115.html [hereinafter Pfizer Press Release]. 
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relief to low-income patients struggling to pay prescription drug 
bills. 140 
1. Prescription Drug Assistance Programs 
PhRMA compiles a directory of company programs that supply 
drugs to doctors whose patients cannot afford them. 141 PhRMA de-
scribes the directory as a continuation of the pharmaceutical indus-
try's tradition of providing prescription drugs to physicians at no cost 
so that their disadvantaged patients can obtain the drugs they need.142 
A physician must first look up the prescription drug that they wish to 
dispense to their needy patients, and then determine if the patient 
meets the requirements set forth by the manufacturer of the drug. 143 
For example, a doctor seeking to obtain any Abbott Laboratories drug 
products free-of-charge must request an application on behalf of the 
patient, fill it out, and wait for a response from the drug manufac-
turer.144 The physician becomes a go-between for the patient and 
pharmaceutical company since the manufacturer will only ship its 
drugs to the doctor's office.l45 
2. RxHope.com 
RxHope.com is a privately held company that provides an inter-
net-based patient assistance and sampling web portal in the pharma-
ceutical industry.146 RxHope.com essentially provides doctors access to 
information regarding the drug assistance programs described 
above. 147 It offers an Assistance Finder that matches patient needs to 
available state, federal and private assistance programs.148 The website 
also provides web-based requisition forms, which the doctor can ac-
cess and complete on his or her private computer.149 RxHope.com 
adds to the PhRMA directory service by including state and federal 
programs in its database of patient drug assistance programs, offering 
140 See id. 
141 PhR111A Directory, supra note 138, at 1. 
142 Jd. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 RxHope, supra note 130. 
147 Id. 
148 !d. 
149 Id. 
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an Assistance Finder search application, and web-enabling the requisi-
tion process.150 
3. Pfizer for Living 
Pfizer is a leading American-based pharmaceutical company.151 It 
began its assistance program for low-income Americans in 1982, but 
recently extended its services directed at Medicare-enrolled pa-
tients.t52 Pfizer created its Share Card that charges a flat $15 fee for 
each thirty-day Pfizer prescription.153 To be eligible to enroll in the 
card program, a patient must be sixty-five years of age or older, or 
otherwise a Medicare enrollee, receive an annual income of less than 
$18,000 separate, or $24,000 filed jointly, and have no other prescrip-
tion drug coverage.154 Pfizer anticipates that the card will be accepted 
by most pharmacies across the United States.I55 In addition, Pfizer 
plans to operate a help-line with live operators to provide information 
to seniors regarding the Share Card program as well as other pro-
grams, both state and federal, for which the patient may be eligible.156 
4. PharmacyCare OneCard 
The National Association of Chain Drug Stores (NACDS) is cur-
rently developing the PharmacyCareOneCard program.157 The card 
will be made available to low-income seniors, who would then present 
it to participating community pharmacies to receive the multiple 
benefit programs offered by individual pharmaceutical companies.158 
The manufacturers are free to determine the extent of their partici-
pation in the discount card program.159 NACDS anticipates that the 
pooling of low-income seniors in a single benefit card will result in 
150 Sec id. 
151 Sec jAMES TAGGART, THE \'\'oRLD PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 35 (1993). 
152 PfizeT Press Release, supra note 139. 
153 /d.; Pfizer, Share Card Questions and Answers, at http:/ /www.pfizerforliving.com/ 
sharecard/nucardqajhtml?cardlmage0ver=5 (last \"isited Jan. I, 2003) [hereinafter Share 
Card Fact Sheet]. 
154 Share Card Fact Sheet, supra note 153. 
155 /d. 
156 Pfizer Press Release, supra note 139. 
157 NACDS, News Releases: Pharmacy Care Alliance Stacks Multiple Drug Savings Into One 
Senior Benefit (Mar. 11, 2002), at http:/ /www.nacds.org/wmspage.cfm?parml=l738 [here-
inafter NA.CDS News Release]. 
158 !d. 
159 /d. 
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significant benefits to enrollees.160 The benefits appear to stem from 
the convenience of a card that contains all information pertinent to 
drug assistance programs eligibility, as well as direct-to-consumer sales 
of drugs under these programs.I6I This card program seems to be a 
pharmaceutical industry counteroffer to the Medicare-Endorsed 
Drug Card proposed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, discussed infra_l62 
B. State Government PTesoiption Drug Programs 
Many states are taking steps beyond Medicaid coverage to pro-
vide relief to their uninsured citizens from soaring prescription drug 
costs.163 Generally, the pharmaceutical industry fights such programs 
where they lack government funding and pressures manufacturers to 
reduce prescription drug prices.I64 
1. Michigan's Rebate and Reference Pricing Scheme 
In late 2001, the Michigan Department of Community Health 
(Department) adopted a policy of routinely refusing to pay for drugs 
in Medicaid or other state-funded plans unless the manufacturer 
agreed to pay a rebate to the state.165 The rebate must be large 
enough to reduce the price of the manufacturer's drug to the amount 
of the lowest price in its therapeutic class.I66 The Department will re-
quire doctors to receive "prior authorization" to prescribe drugs made 
by pharmaceutical companies that refuse to pay the state the re-
bate.167 The purpose of this requirement is to create a disincentive for 
doctors to prescribe drugs manufactured by companies that refuse to 
participate in the state rebate program.I68 The overall goal of the De-
160 !d. 
161 See id. As noted earlier, manufacturers that offer drug assistance programs currently 
send their products to doctors' offices, and not to the low-income patients. PhR!IL1 Direc-
tory, supra note 138. 
162 See NACDS News Release, supra note 157; see also HHS Medicare Initiative, supra note 
133. 
163 See e.g., Michigan Program, supra note 132; Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 132; 
Maine Bill, supra note 132. 
164 See Michigan Program, supra note 132; Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 132; 
Maine Bill, supra note 132. 
165 Michigan Program, supra note 132. 
166 !d. 
167 /d. 
168 /d. 
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partment's policy is to reduce the amount the Department must pay 
for drugs in its Medicaid and state-run health care plans.l69 
2. Wisconsin's T-Rx Program 
Wisconsin recently introduced a bill that would harness market 
forces to reduce the cost of prescription drugs for its citizens.I7o The 
state would negotiate with manufacturers, much in the same way 
health insurance companies do, to garner reduced drug prices.171 
Companies that refuse to participate in the program could be placed 
on a list that would require pre-approval for their drugs as prescribed 
under Medicaid and other state-funded health plans.172 Those op-
posed to the bill declare that the plan will result in limiting the access 
of some people to certain black-listed brand-name drugs.l73 
3. Maine Manufacturer Rebate Scheme 
Maine introduced a mandatory drug-rebate program in 200}.1 74 
Under the plan, the state has the authority to negotiate manufacturer 
rebates, the proceeds of which shall be set aside in a special fund. 175 
Maine will use the proceeds of the fund to reimburse pharmacies that 
of{er discounts on prescription drugs. 176 Maine mandates the partici-
pation of all manufacturers that receive Medicaid funding.177 Manu-
facturers subject to the requirement that refuse to agree to lower their 
prices will be placed on a list requiring pre-authorization for prescrip-
tion of their drugs to Medicaid enrollees.178 Manufacturers that con-
tinue to refuse to reduce prices by July 2003 will be subject to state 
price controls.1 79 PhRMA objected to the legislation because it ille-
gally limits Medicaid participants' access to certain brand-name drugs 
and violates the Commerce Clause in its attempts to regulate com-
169 /d. 
170 Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 132. 
171 /d. 
172 /d. 
173 /d. 
174 r..Iaine Bill, supra note 132; see also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 
249 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2001) (upholding Maine's Act to Establish Fairer Pricing for Pre-
scription Drugs. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681 (2002) ). 
175 Maine Bill, supra note 132. 
176fd. 
177 /d. 
178 /d. 
179 /d. 
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merce outside Maine.180 Mter an initial injunction granted to PhRMA, 
Maine was allowed to proceed with its plan, so long as it agreed to im-
pose no restriction on single-source drugs, to allow for a 72-hour 
emergency supply of pre-authorization drugs, and to grant or deny 
pre-authorization requests within twenty-four hours. 181 It is the first 
program of its type that includes the possibility that the state will im-
pose price controls.l82 
C. Federal Government Prescription Drug Programs 
The federal government is currently grappling with the way in 
which it will approach the prescription drug price crisis. 183 A current 
initiative proposes a short-term alleviation of rising prescription drug 
costs through prescription drug discount cards.184 One federal office 
recently directed its focus toward ways in which to incorporate a pre-
scription drug coverage service into the Medicare system.185 On the 
whole, the pharmaceutical industry favors the latter as the most effec-
tive and comprehensive solution to providing prescription drugs to 
low-income and uninsured individuals.l86 
1. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has 
proposed an initiative whereby the federal government will sanction 
qualified private sector prescription drug discount card programs as 
"Medicare-endorsed. "187 These Medicare-endorsed card programs 
must have the ability to obtain substantial manufacturer rebates or 
discounts on brand-name drugs. They then must be willing and able 
to pass on a portion of these discounts to their enrollees in order to 
reduce the price of prescription drugs.188 The card program is re-
quired to provide a discount on at least one drug in each therapeutic 
drug class, group and sub-group representing those drugs that Medi-
lBO Maine Bill, supra note 132. 
181 Michigan Program, supra note 132. 
182 !d. 
183 See, e.g., CBO Medicare Testimony, supra note 76, at 1. 
184 HHS Medicare Initiative, supra note 133. 
185 CBO Medicare Testimony, supra note 76, at 1. 
186 PhRMA, Congress Should Enact a Prescription Drug Benefit (Sept. 5, 2001), at http:/ I 
www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/05.09.2001.288.cfm. 
187 HHS Medicare Initiative, supra note 133, at 7. 
188 !d. at 7-8. 
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care patients commonly take. 189 The card program must enroll all 
Medicare beneficiaries who want to participate in its plan.I90 
The NACDS strongly opposed a prior version of this initiative as 
being too exclusive and damaging to small community drug stores.191 
Apparently in response to this criticism, the HHS amended their ini-
tial initiative to require the card programs to offer a broad national or 
regional contracted retail pharmacy network. 192 In addition, the 
amended initiative requires that each discount card program publish 
a list of the drug prices it offers, so that enrollees may make an in-
formed decision as to which plan they join, as well ensuring that the 
discount card programs compete with each other in obtaining the 
lowest price for prescription drugs_l93 
In adopting this initiative, HHS seeks to harness market strategies 
that currently afford private insurance companies and bulk prescrip-
tion drug purchasers lower prescription drug prices.I94 HHS's re-
quirement that Medicare patients enroll in only one discount card 
program at a time attempts to create a pool of drug purchasers that 
would give drug manufacturers an incentive to negotiate lower prices 
with the discount card program administrators. 195 The initiative also 
allows the discount drug programs the opportunity to employ other 
market-based strategies to reduce the cost of prescription drugs, in-
cluding the creation of drug formularies, patient education, phar-
macy networks, and mail order)96 
2. Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage Proposals 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) presented a report to 
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means 
Subcommittee on Health in March 2001.197 It proposed several ver-
sions of prescription drug coverage benefits to Medicare enrollees.l98 
In general, all plans entail low cost-sharing requirements and a stop-
loss protection-a dollar limit above which the enrollee would not be 
189 !d. at 8. 
190 /d. 
191 Nat'l Ass'n of Chain Drug Stores Complaint at 17, Nat'l Ass'n of Chain Drug Stores 
\'.Thompson (No. l:OICV01554). 
192 HHS Medicare Initiative, supra note 133, at 8. 
193 /d. at 20. 
194 ld. at 9. 
195 Sec id. 
196 ld. at II. 
197 CBO Medicare Testimony, supra note 76, at I. 
198 /d. at 10-14. 
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required to cost-share.l99 All plans require some form of a monthly 
premium designed to cover a certain percentage of total cost of pre-
scription drugs.200 The enrollee would be required to make a co-
payment for each prescription filled, up to the stop-loss amount.20l 
The government would provide a subsidy for low-income enrollees so 
that they may participate without the burden of the monthly premi-
ums or cost-sharing co-payments.2°2 
The CBO anticipates possible employment of pharmacy benefit 
managers (PBM) to administer the Medicare drug coverage.203 PBM's 
are common in private health plans.204 They process claims, negotiate 
drug discounts with manufacturers, and try to steer beneficiaries to 
cost-saving alternatives-such as formularies, mail orders, or generic 
drugs.205 
IV. DiscussiON: TAKE-HOME SuGGESTIONS 
A. Lessons Garnered from Overseas 
1. The French Experience 
It is true that patients in France tend not to have many out-of-
pocket expenses for prescription drugs.2°6 Realizing that their patients 
will not pay for drugs, doctors in France feel little or no pressure to 
reduce the number of drugs they prescribe or to seek less expensive 
alternatives to prescription drugs. 207 Another consequence of low pre-
scription drug prices in France is that neither patient nor doctor has 
much motivation to switch to generic drugs.208 This may be the pri-
mary reason why generic drug use in France is low.209 
Critics argue that the French system is inefficient and repressive 
to drug innovation.210 The inefficiency argument stems from the fact 
that while France enjoys some of the lowest drug prices in the world, 
199 !d. at 7. 
20° See id. at 10-14. 
201 See id. 
2°2 See CBO Medicare Testimony, supra note 76, at 10-14. 
203 !d. at 8. 
204 !d. 
205 !d. 
206 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 163. 
207 !d. 
208 !d. at 164. 
209 !d. 
210 Jd. 
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it fails to keep overall prescription drug spending down.211 The 
French system does not hold either the doctor or the patient ac-
countable for the prescription drug use.212 France is a prime example 
of why price regulation alone is not an efficient way to solve the prob-
lem of rising prescription drug spending.213 The French system is ar-
guably repressive to drug innovation as its price regulation bears little 
relation to pharmaceutical R&D costs.214 
2. A German Tutorial 
The German health care system includes a sophisticated ac-
countability mechanism.215 As discussed supra, German patients are 
required to pay a certain amount for each subgroup, and must pay 
the difference if their prescribed drug is more expensive than the ref-
erence price.216 Doctors, therefore, avoid prescribing drugs that cost 
more than the reference price.217 This selection process is one means 
by which Germany can reduce overall expenditure for prescription 
drugs.218 Also, since the government regularly audits prescriber per-
formance to evaluate efficiency, doctors have an incentive to substi-
tute generic drugs when possible.219 This is another vehicle for con-
taining prescription drug costs.22o 
The key element of the German prescription drug system is that 
it requires both doctors and patients to share in the cost of health 
care coverage.22I This forced accountability appears to have slowed 
the rate of increase in drug spending, as well as lowered the overall 
number of prescriptions issued.222 Also important, however, is the fact 
that Germany provides some flexibility in its doctor-accountability 
scheme by allowing for a grace amount of budget overflow.223 In this 
way, Germany appears to have tied accountability to both the pre-
~II Sec Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 163-64. 
21 ~ Sec id. 
m Sccid. 
214 Sec id. 
215 Sec id. at 165-66. 
216 Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 166. 
21i ld. 
21BJd. at 165-66. 
219 ld. 
22o Sec id.; sec also Sr.HWF:ITZER, supra note 21, at 177. 
221 Sec Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 165-66. 
222 ld. 
223 Sec id. at 166. 
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scriber and the end user of a drug, while at the same time it has al-
lowed doctors to meet the specific demands of each patient. 224 
3. The British Example 
One important aspect of Britain's coverage of prescription drug 
use is the way in which the government actively negotiates with the 
pharmaceutical industry.225 Direct negotiation with the pharmaceuti-
cal industry by major purchasers, as discussed supra, evens the bar-
gaining power between drug purchaser and manufacturer.226 This ul-
timately leads to reduced prices when compared to the prices that the 
drug manufacturers otherwise offer to individual drug consumers.227 
Another interesting element of the British drug plan is that the 
government consciously seeks to protect R&D by allowing the phar-
maceutical companies to make a profit on their drug sales in the Brit-
ain.228 This is in drastic contrast to the overly stifling price controls 
imposed by France.229 Yet, the British government seeks to limit the 
amount of profit a drug manufacturer can make on its British con-
sumers by capping the profit margin.230 In this way, Britain seems to 
balance the need to fund innovation and a desire to protect British 
consumers from overzealous drug manufacturers.231 
Some critics argue that even this more relaxed approach discour-
ages pharmaceutical R&D in Britain.232 Critics point to a recent trend 
of pharmaceutical companies shifting their research dollars to the 
United States.233 This may be due to the fact that, up to this point, the 
United States has afforded pharmaceutical companies the most fertile 
ground for investment by refusing to impose prescription drug price 
policies.234 It is also unclear that the sole reason for decreased R&D 
spending in Britain is directly related to drug price negotiations, since 
several other factors would have an impact on a manufacturer's deci-
224 See id. 
225 See Huttin, supra note II5, at 276. 
226 See id.; see also ScHWEITZER, supra note 2I, at I 04. 
227 See Huttin, supra note 115, at 276; see alw ScHWEITZER, supra note 2I, at I 04. 
228 See Huttin, supra note 115, at 276. 
229 See Wertheimer, supra note 48, at I64. 
230 See Huttin, supra note 115, at 276. 
231 See id. 
232 See Europe's Addiction, supra note 7. 
233 ld. 
234 See Price of Medicine, supra note 41. 
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sion to spend research dollars in a country.235 Such factors include the 
country's patent laws and marketing regulations. 236 Furthermore, at 
least one study ranked Britain third among nations preferred by 
pharmaceutical companies for future R&D facilities-with the United 
States and Germany taking first and second.237 
Britain incorporates an accountability scheme much like the one 
in Germany.238 Again, successful price containment strategies seem to 
entail both a bargained-for prescription drug price and some measure 
of forced accountability for consumers.239 Note that government regu-
lation aimed at imposing prescriber and user accountability attempts 
to resolve the unique problem in prescription drug consumption: the 
end user being divorced from the entity that pays for the drug.240 
B. The Advantage of P1ivate Industry-Driven Programs 
One important conclusion that may be drawn from the prolifera-
tion of industry-sponsored prescription drug programs is that both 
the pharmaceutical companies and the pharmacies recognize a need 
to help individuals who desperately require their drugs, but who can-
not afford them. 241 It also seems apparent that pharmaceutical com-
panies will be willing to go a long way in cooperating with government 
action, so long as the government avoids imposing strict drug price 
controls.242 A government initiative might result in more successful 
negotiation given the current atmosphere and the industry's overall 
condemnation of price controls.243 
In addition, a government prescription drug program must be 
able to utilize the benefits that the private industry currently offers to 
its underprivileged consumers.244 Sin.ce several manufacturers offer 
235 Sec H.Th. ,·an Asselt, Policies on Pharmaceutical Patents: The Impact of Patent Protection 
011 R&D, in THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKET 263 (Christine Huttin & Nick Bosanquet, 
eds., I992); ScHWEITZER, supra note 2I, at I4 7. 
236 ScC\·an Asselt, supra note 235, at 263; ScHWEITZER, supm note 2I, at I47. 
237 See TAGGART, supra note I5I, at 437. 
2!18 Sec Wertheimer, supra note 48, at I65-66; Huttin, supra note II5, at 276. 
239 Sec Wertheimer, supra note 48, at I65-66; Huttin, supra note 115, at 276. 
240 Sec Balance, supra note I, at 95-96. 
241 See, e.g., Michigan Program, supra note I32; Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 
I32; Maine Bill, supra note I32. 
242 Sec, e.g., Michigan Program, supra note I32; Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 
132; Maine Bill, supra note I32. 
243 Sec, e.g .. Michigan Program, supra note 132; Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 
I32; l\faine Bill, supra note I32. 
244 Sec, e.g., PhRJ\iA Assistance Programs, supra note I30; see also HHS Medicare Initiative, 
supra note 133, at I. 
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drugs at no charge to consumers who meet their requirements, a gov-
ernment program should be able to identify eligible recipients and 
provide assistance in obtaining the benefits that the industry currently 
offers.245 However, since the drug assistance programs exclude con-
sumers who receive prescription drug coverage, adoption of Medicare 
prescription drug coverage might remove even the most needy pa-
tients from the benefit of free prescription drugs.246 Perhaps the gov-
ernment could negotiate an exemption for Medicare recipients who 
otherwise meet the manufacturers' requirements, but this issue is out-
side the scope of this note.247 
C. Issues Regarding State-Sponsored Programs 
The availability of state prescription drug price schemes and dis-
count cards demonstrates the ability of the government to utilize its 
bargaining power to benefit its citizens.248 Michigan, for example, elic-
its rebates from drug manufacturers much like major private pur-
chasers, such as hospitals. 249 Wisconsin and Maine have similar 
plans.250 The state plans also operate pre-authorization lists that re-
semble the negative list maintained by France.251 Both the negotiated 
rebates and the quasi-formulary approaches currently used by several 
states mirror the same cost containment strategies adopted by both 
domestic private health organizations and foreign governments.252 
The major problem with state-run prescription drug schemes is 
that they are ad-hoc. 253 While the citizens of Maine, Wisconsin and 
Michigan enjoy the fruits of their government's bargaining, citizens of 
245 See, e.g., PhRJiv!A Assistance Programs, supra note 130; see also HHS Medicare Initiative, 
supra note 133, at 1. 
246 See, e.g., PhRM.A. Assistance Programs, supra note 130; see also HHS Medicare Initiative, 
supra note 133, at 1. 
247 See, e.g., PhRJiv!A Assistance Programs, supra note 130; see also HHS Medicare Initiative, 
supra note 133, at 1. 
248 See Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 132; Maine Bill, supra note 132; Michigan 
Program, supra note 132. 
249 See Michigan Program, supra note 132; ScHWEITZER, supra note 21, at 104. 
250 See Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 132; Maine Bill, supra note 132. 
251 See Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 132; Maine Bill, supra note 132; Michigan 
Program, supra note 132; Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 162. 
252 See, e.g., Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 132; see also ScHWEITZER, supra note 
21, at 175. 
253 See Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 132; Maine Bill, supra note 132; Michigan 
Program, supra note 132. 
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states that lack such programs go unprotected.254 One concern that 
such disparity raises is the possibility that uninsured patients in the 
non-prescription plan states will suffer higher drug prices as the 
pharmacies shift their costs to the decreasing number of underrepre-
sented Americans.255 It seems logical that one way to avoid such hard-
ship is for the United States to adopt a federal prescription drug 
plan.256 
D. The Potential for Federal Prescription Drug Programs 
While the Medicare-endorsed prescription drug discount card is 
a step in the right direction, it does not go nearly as far as needed to 
ensure that the federal government fully harnesses market forces to 
reduce the overall prescription drug expenditure in the United 
States.257 The discount cards create another middleman who can put 
manufacturer rebates in his pocket.258 The rebates should go directly 
to the end user to reduce the cost of prescription drugs.259 In addi-
tion, the availability of several competing discount prescription drug 
cards reduces the bargaining power of the individual programs, since 
it reduces the number of members in each program.260 
The CBO's proposal for Medicare prescription drug coverage is 
the most promising solution to rising drug costs for elderly and dis-
abled Americans.261 Yet, the current proposal should incorporate cost 
containment strategies that other countries currently employ.262 For 
example, the CBO contemplates the use of PBMs.263 The advantage of 
PBMs is that they have the potential to help artificially impose ac-
countability on both the doctor and patient.264 The PBMs steer pa-
tients to less costly, yet therapeutically similar, prescription drugs.265 
With the development of a formulary, the PBM could also discourage 
254 Sec Proposed Wisconsin Bill, supra note 132; Maine Bill, supra note 132; Michigan 
Program, supra note 132. 
m Sec id.; sec also United States Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare-
Endorsed PrcSC1iption Drug Discount Card (Feb. 28, 2002), availabk at http:/ /www.nacds.org/ 
user-assets/PDF _files/feb02_pdc_sumrnary.pdf. 
256 Sec generally CBO Medicare Testimony, supra note 76. 
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258 Sec id. at 13. 
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260 Sec id. at 20. 
261 Sec generally CBO Medicare Testimony, supra note 76. 
262 Sec id.; sec generally Wertheimer, supra note 48. 
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264 Sec id. 
265 /d. 
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doctors from prescribing drugs the manufacturers of which fail to is-
sue discounts to Medicare beneficiaries.266 Germany has demon-
strated the potential success resulting from government imposition of 
prescriber answerability.267 While it is doubtful that a Medicare pre-
scription drug coverage plan would include audits of physician pre-
scribing practices, it should contain some version of this prescriber 
accountability. 268 
The CBO also envisions some form of cost-sharing. 269 France has 
shown the need for imposing some financial burden on prescription 
drug users.270 As discussed supra, France spends more than 16% of its 
total health expenditures on prescription drugs. 271 This is almost 
twice the average percentage of spending of Britain and the United 
States independently.272 Part of the reason for France's large overall 
spending on prescription drugs· is that the end user, the patient, pays 
very little money out of pocket for the prescription drug.273 A Medi-
care prescription plan must include co-payments paid by the patient, 
provided that consumers who cannot afford the co-payments due to 
financial hardship are eligible for government subsidies that cover the 
cost of the co-payments.274 
While the CBO report contains estimates on the anticipated cost 
of a Medicare prescription drug plan, it fails to assess the overall im-
pact of such coverage on total Medicare expenditure.275 Critics of the 
current system complain that some patients must choose between 
filling prescriptions and putting food on the table due to exorbitant 
prices.276 The pharmaceutical industry argues that proper use of its 
drugs shortens the total number of days individuals spend in the hos-
pital and reduces overall health care costs for certain chronic dis-
eases.277 It appears that a prescription drug coverage plan would en-
266 See id. 
267 See Wertheimer, supra note 48, at I65. 
268 See id. 
269 CBO Medicare Testimony, supra note 76, at IO. 
270 See Wertheimer, supra note 48, at I60. 
271 !d. 
272 See id. 
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cations/ quickfacts/03.04.2001.206.cfm (last visited Jan. I, 2003). 
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courage patients to take drug prescribed to them, thereby alleviating 
the burden of hospital costs on the Medicare budget.278 
V. ANALYSIS: REcoMMENDATIONS FOR A FEDERAL MEDICARE 
PRESCRIPTION DRuG CovERAGE PLAN 
Absent the formation of a cohesive national health plan, and the 
imposition of prescription drug regulation, no single federal program 
can fully alleviate the burden of prescription drug costs for all Arneri-
cans.279 As demonstrated by France's situation, even strict price regu-
lation cannot solve the issue of rising drug expenditures.280 There-
fore, the best solution appears to be a federal Medicare prescription 
drug plan that provides drug coverage to the patients who need such 
coverage the most-elderly and disabled Arnericans.28I 
A U.S. prescription drug plan must balance the public's desire 
for innovative drugs and the need to keep drugs affordable.282 To 
meet the affordability demands, the government should look to na-
tions overseas for suggestions.283 It appears that the best way to 
achieve reductions in prescription drug prices is for the government 
to harness market forces, as opposed to direct government price regu-
lation. As shown by other countries, as well as by the private medical 
insurance industry, some of the ways to harness market forces to re-
duce the cost of prescription drugs include: pooling consumers to 
create bargaining power, instituting drug lists or formularies, and 
artificially imposing accountability on doctors and patients.284 
One way for the federal government to pool prescription drug 
consumers is for it to enact a Medicare prescription drug coverage 
plan.285 Several states have demonstrated that the government can 
effectively bargain for manufacturer rebates and reduce prescription 
drug prices when it negotiates on behalf of the consumers enrolled in 
state-operated Medicaid programs.286 The United States might benefit 
from the adoption of a negotiation structure similar to the one em-
278 Sec id. 
279 Sec generally CBO Medicare Testimony, supra note 76; HHS Afedicare Initiative, supra 
note 133. 
280 Sec Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 160. 
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283 Sec Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 175. 
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ployed by Britain.287 The pharmaceutical industry in the United States 
could form a representative coalition that bargains on behalf of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers operating in the United States, much 
like the ABPI in Britain.288 The federal government would then form 
a voluntary collective agreement with the pharmaceutical coalition to 
encourage manufacturer rebates, establish reference pricing, and 
possibly, set profit margins.289 
This voluntary agreement helps to reduce the cost of prescrip-
tion drugs used by Medicare recipients while it avoids direct govern-
ment price regulation.290 The mechanism of a bargained-for prescrip-
tion drug price helps to ensure that the R&D needs of the pharm-
aceutical industry are met while it harnesses market forces to reduce 
prescription drug prices.291 Establishing a reference price encourages 
competition between pharmaceutical companies to reduce their pre-
scription drug prices.292 Establishing profit margins is another means 
by which the government can encourage pharmaceutical companies 
to continue pursuing innovative drugs while it protects American citi-
zens from price gouging.293 
To ensure that Medicare prescription drug dollars are efficiently 
spent, the United States should incorporate cost containment strate-
gies employed by the private health insurance industries and other 
countries.294 It should utilize PBMs to create drug formularies, en-
courage the use of generic drugs, and provide education to doctors 
and patients on proper prescription drug use.295 The formulary must 
be flexible enough to allow the prescribing doctor to meet the indi-
vidualized needs of her patient.296 Yet, the formulary cannot be so 
adaptable that it fails to influence prescribing behavior.297 Also, the 
Medicare recipient should be encouraged, if not mandated, to use 
generic versions of therapeutically equivalent drugs when possible.298 
287 See Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 167-68. 
288 See id. at 167. 
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A PBM should educate doctors on the Medicare formulary as well as 
on the availability of generic drugs.299 
A Medicare prescription drug coverage plan must have some 
mechanism for making the drug prescriber and the user account-
able.300 The United States might benefit from a co-payment scheme 
similar to that which is used in Germany.301 The United States could 
set a nominal co-payment fee that would decrease if the patient used a 
generic alternative.302 The federal government could then set refer-
ence prices for drugs in the same therapeutic class.303 The reference 
price could be set as part of the negotiations between the pharmaceu-
tical coalition and the U.S. government as described supra.304 Patients 
whose drug costs exceeds the reference price would then be respon-
sible for the excess amount, in addition to the co-payment.305 This 
cost-sharing system encourages patients and doctors to choose the 
least expensive drug available to the patient in a therapeutic class.306 
CoNcLusiON 
Americans are justified in their concerns that they subsidize pre-
scription drug regulations abroad. And yet, calls for government price 
controls miss the issues at the heart of the debate. The fact that some 
patients pay more for a drug than do others should not be the major 
concern for Americans. Price differentials reflect several factors, most 
of which lie outside the ambit of the federal government. Instead, 
Americans should realize that the real threat is that patients who need 
life-saving drugs the most cannot afford them. 
The United States already has a system in place to assist these pa-
tients in need of medical attention-the U.S. Medicare program. The 
easiest way to ensure that Medicare enrollees can afford the cost of 
their prescription drugs is by enacting a Medicare prescription drug 
benefit. The prescription drug plan can minimize its costs by employ-
ing the cost containment strategies used by nations abroad. The 
United States should also learn from the mistakes made by other na-
tions. Through careful observation of the successes and failures of 
299 Sec id. at 190. 
m Sec Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 168. 
!!OI Sec id. at 166. 
!!02 Sec id. 
!!OS Sec id. 
!!04 Sec id. at 166-67. 
!!05 Sec Wertheimer, supra note 48, at 166. 
!!OS Sec id. 
354 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 26:325 
other countries, the United States can enact a prescription drug plan 
that effectively encourages drug innovation while protecting the 
financial needs of its citizens. 
